Notes for: The Return of Great-Power Diplomacy

title: The Return of Great-Power Diplomacy: How Strategic Dealmaking Can Fortify American Power author: Wess Mitchell source: Foreign Affairs published: 2025-05-01

Introduction

The author is suggesting these diplomatic options for America because he believes the United States is in a precarious geopolitical situation that demands a fundamental shift in its foreign policy approach. He argues that the post-Cold War era of American unipolarity, where the USA could rely primarily on military and economic might to achieve its goals and even attempt to transform other nations into liberal democracies, is over.

Motivations

• Return of Great-Power Rivalry: The author asserts that “great-power rivalry is back, and systemic war is a very real possibility.” The USA now faces formidable, continent-sized rivals in China and Russia, both with significant economic and military capabilities. The previous USA approach of attempting to “overpower everybody” is no longer viable.
• Finite Means vs. Infinite Threats: The United States no longer has a military capable of fighting and defeating all its foes simultaneously, nor can it drive another great power to ruin through sanctions alone. There’s a growing “gap between the United States’ finite means and the virtually infinite threats arrayed against it.” Diplomacy, in its classical, hard-nosed form, is needed to manage this imbalance.
• Historical Precedent: The author draws heavily on historical examples (Archidamus II of Sparta, Roman and Byzantine empires, Metternich, Bismarck) to illustrate how great powers have successfully used strategic diplomacy to:
  • Buy time and prepare for conflict: Allowing a nation to strengthen its domestic resources and cultivate new alliances before engaging in war.
  • Form alliances to constrain enemies: Splintering rival coalitions and limiting their options.
  • Cultivate favourable balances of power: Projecting influence beyond immediate material capabilities.
• Avoiding a Two-Front War (Sequencing Rivals): A central tenet of the author’s argument is that the USA cannot afford to confront China and Russia simultaneously. Strategic diplomacy is crucial for “rearranging power in space and time” to avoid “tests of strength beyond their ability.” This directly informs his suggestion to seek a détente with the “weaker” rival (Russia) to focus resources and attention on the “stronger” one (China).
• Rectifying Past “Mistakes”: The author criticises past USA foreign policy, particularly the post-Cold War approach to China, where Washington believed economic engagement would lead to liberalisation. Instead, this inadvertently strengthened China’s economic and military power, creating a profound dependence of the USA military on Chinese-made products. Strategic diplomacy aims to reverse such “unforced errors.”
• Enhancing Leverage for Negotiations: By rebuilding domestic economic strength, recalibrating alliances for greater reciprocity, and strengthening military presence in key regions (like the Indo-Pacific), the USA can create a “position of strength” from which to negotiate more effectively with its rivals. This is distinct from “appeasement” because it’s about gaining advantages, not making concessions without benefit.
• Rethinking Alliances for Shared Burden: The author argues that alliances should not be seen as a one-way street where the USA bears the primary burden. He advocates for a more reciprocal relationship, especially with European allies, where they assume greater responsibility for their own conventional defense, freeing up USA resources to address the primary challenge posed by China.
• The Ultimate “Why”: Beyond mere survival, the author suggests that strategic diplomacy is the “best shot America has at shoring up its position for protracted competition.” It’s about enabling the USA to “live until you die” – to maintain its strength, influence, and way of life in a dangerous world, thereby serving its national interest. The job of diplomacy, for the author, is not to usher in a utopian world but to “succeed at geopolitics” and ensure the state’s survival amidst constant competition.

Options for US

• Re-engagement with Major Adversaries (Russia, China, Iran):
  • Direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin: To seek an end to the war in Ukraine.
  • Communication with Chinese leader Xi Jinping: Regarding holding a summit to discuss relations.
  • Letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei: Aimed at resolving Iran’s nuclear program.
  • Shift from “overpowering everybody” to strategic deal making: Acknowledging that the USA no longer possesses the military or economic capability to simultaneously defeat all foes or drive another great power to ruin through sanctions.
• Recalibrating Alliances for Greater Reciprocity:
  • Renegotiating the balance of benefits and burdens: Ensuring allies contribute more to their own defence and align with USA economic interests.
  • “Nixon-style arrangement” with Europe:
    • USA provides extended deterrence and certain strategic systems (e.g., nuclear protection).
    • European allies provide the bulk of conventional frontline fighting capabilities.
    • Demand reciprocity in market access and stipulate that allies benefit from USA innovation only if they adopt American regulatory standards.
• Prioritising and Managing Rivalries (Focus on Russia to isolate China):
  • Seek a détente with Russia: Leveraging Russia’s “depleted state” after the Ukraine war to disadvantage Beijing.
  • End the war in Ukraine favourably for the USA:
    • Prioritise an armistice, pushing wider political settlements into a separate, long-term process (likened to the 1950s Korea model).
    • Insist on Ukrainian sovereignty as a precondition for talks.
    • Use USA sanctions, military assistance, and seized Russian assets as leverage.
    • Establish a defence relationship with Ukraine akin to Israel’s (not a formal alliance, but consistent provision of defensive needs).
  • Complicate Russia’s relationship with China:
    • Exploit areas where Russian and Chinese interests diverge (e.g., Russia’s dependence on China, China’s inroads in Central Asia and Russian Far East).
    • Resist Russian efforts for a grand bargain involving USA concessions in eastern NATO states.
    • Seek a “compartmentalised détente” with Russia, relaxing constraints where interests align and heightening them where they conflict.
    • Potentially lift restrictions preventing Asian allies from offering investment alternatives to China in Russia’s eastern territories in exchange for Russian concessions on Ukraine.
    • Propose a revised arms control framework with Russia (similar to Reagan-Gorbachev in the 1980s) to force Russia to accept risk in its strategic arsenal, allowing the USA to focus nuclear attention on China.
• Addressing the Iran Nuclear Threat:
  • Leverage Israel’s recent military actions: Expand on the Abraham Accords template by fostering Israeli-Saudi normalisation.
  • Peel off old Iranian surrogates: Like Lebanon and Syria, potentially by promoting an internal balance of power in Syria that favours the Kurds and keeps Islamist factions at bay.
  • Work with Turkey: On shared interests like Ukraine, and encourage reconciliation between Turkey and USA allies in the region.
  • Negotiate from a position of strength: Given Iran’s currently weaker position, to derail its nuclear ambitions and limit the need for future USA military interventions.
• Strategic Engagement with China:
  • Isolate China: By turning off its viable options for forming anti-American coalitions.
  • Build the biggest possible coalitions against Beijing: While simultaneously strengthening the USA domestic economy.
  • Encourage a regional balance of power in Asia: Utilising existing tensions between China and its neighbours (e.g., India, Nepal, Japan, Philippines, Vietnam).
  • Minimise rhetoric and maximise actions: To enhance USA leverage for direct diplomacy.
  • Strengthen alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Pressing for greater reciprocity in tariffs and defence burden-sharing, and strengthening USA military deterrent.
  • Prioritise India: Treat New Delhi as a key ally for technology transfers and ramp up plans for economic corridors to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
  • Avoid criticising India on unrelated issues: Such as human rights or Russian arms/oil purchases, which have previously hindered cooperation.
  • Negotiate for a more favourable balance of power:
    • Insist on a reduced trade deficit.
    • Expanded access for American financial institutions in China.
    • Encourage Chinese investment in targeted USA industries.
    • Potentially a currency revaluation (stronger renminbi, weaker dollar) that benefits both countries.
• Domestic Reinforcement for Diplomacy:
  • Increase energy production, reduce the deficit, and deregulate: To strengthen the USA economy and create a position of strength.
  • Reorient the USA Foreign Service:
    • School officers in negotiation as a core competency.
    • Train them in military and economic matters.
    • Align diplomatic funding and priorities with the National Security Strategy.
    • Bar diplomats from promoting “progressive causes” that may alienate allies or embolden opponents.